Monday Musings: Lessons of playoff ball

Zach Randolph and the Grizzlies have pounded the Spurs in the post. (Joe Murphy/NBAE via Getty Images)

They developed into models of the modern NBA, the two best teams among a handful of similar clubs whose shared style seemed to point in the direction of the league’s general evolution.

The Spurs and the Magic aren’t identical, but over the last few seasons they (along with the LeBron James Cavaliers, coached by a Gregg Popovich disciple) embraced the same general principles on both ends: They built their offenses around pick-and-roll attacks and post games designed to generate three-point shots, burying the notion that long shots worth an extra point were somehow bad things or signs of weakness. They de-emphasized the offensive glass in favor of getting back on defense, a strategy that has become almost mainstream as offensive rebounding rates drop to record lows leaguewide every season. And on defense, they wanted, above all else, to force long two-point jump shots and rebound the plentiful misses those shots produce. That meant staying in front of your man, resisting the temptation to gamble for steals and rebounding record-high percentages of opponent misses.

It wasn’t the only way to win — not when the Lakers dominated with the triangle and Boston made two appearances in the Finals with a more aggressive defense — but it seemed like such a sound way to win, provided you had the right sort of talent to play this way. It seemed like the future.

And then the Grizzlies and Hawks happened, reminding us of three important truths:

1) There are still so many ways to win in the NBA.

2) Some of those methods might work better in the playoffs, where the game is still dramatically different no matter how much we want to believe in the trend-setting importance of the first 82.

3) Any system requires talent, and when that talent declines, as it clearly has in Orlando outside the center position, teams with fantastic regular-season scoring margins can become vulnerable. (And, yes, Jason Collins has had something to do with that.)

In Memphis, the top-seeded Spurs have run into a team that is delightfully anti-modern. The Grizzlies — who lead the series 2-1 heading into Monday’s Game 4 in Memphis — have taken fewer three-pointers than any team over the last three seasons, choosing instead to pound the ball in the post and crash the offensive glass. Their defense is built around the notion that gambling is good; they force more turnovers than anyone, and they live with the consequences — a few open driving lanes and poor defensive rebounding numbers. Still, it seemed like a defensive system that might fail in the postseason — when teams take better care of the ball — and specifically against a motion-and-cutting machine like San Antonio that would punish the reckless.

And Atlanta? In the era of the quick point guard, the pick-and-roll and more complex movement, the Hawks are a boring isolation team at heart. First-year coach Larry Drew installed a motion offense this season, and the Hawks are still running a lot of those sets now against Orlando — at least for the first 10 seconds of the shot clock. The motion doesn’t really lead to a shot; it’s mostly just a lot of running and screening that ends with an isolation — Joe Johnson destroying the suddenly ancient Jason Richardson off the dribble or in the post, Al Horford backing down Brandon Bass, Josh Smith hitting a hook over Hedo Turkoglu. It looks so pedestrian.

But Memphis and Atlanta are winning (the latter leads its series 3-1), and they are doing so even as they have played as more exaggerated versions of themselves so far in the playoffs. For instance, about 15.6 percent of Memphis’ regular-season possessions ended with a post-up play; that number is up to 21.5 percent against San Antonio, according to the stat-tracking service Synergy Sports. The Hawks finished about 13.5 percent of their regular-season possessions with an isolation play — an average number. But in the playoffs, they are isolating on nearly 21 percent of their possessions, a giant increase.

Both teams are also running more pick-and-roll plays, a trend they share with nine of the other 14 playoff teams. The Spurs lead the way in this regard; a whopping 27.3 percent of their playoff possessions have ended with a shot from either the ball-handler or roll man on the pick-and-roll, compared to a rate of about 21 percent in the regular season.

Teams get more conservative in the postseason. As John Hollinger noted on Friday, teams are playing at a much slower pace in these playoffs and turning the ball over less. But the changes are deeper than that: Teams change their style of play to focus on what they find more comfortable and less risky, and once they find something that works, they stick with it. Only three teams — San Antonio, Chicago and Portland — are getting out in transition more in these playoffs than they did in the regular season, according to Synergy. Only five teams are getting fewer shots in the playoffs than they did in the regular season from either of the two participants in the pick-and-roll. That statistic may actually understate the degree to which the league falls back on its signature play in the spring, because a lot of shots Synergy logs as “spot-up” chances come out of pick-and-rolls.

The Blazers got about 13 percent of their shots from post-ups in the regular season; that’s up to 21 percent in four playoff games against Dallas, as the Blazers have slowed down even more than usual and run nearly all of their offense through LaMarcus Aldridge and their bullying guards on the block. Orlando has increased its number of post-ups just as dramatically while running pick-and-rolls with the same heavy frequency as it did in the regular season. The Mavs, for their part, are posting up, isolating more and running less.

In fact, only three teams — San Antonio, Philadelphia and Indiana — have seen the percentage of their possessions devoted to isolations drop by more than one percentage point from their regular-season mark, and a majority are isolating much more often in the playoffs.

This isn’t to say that teams playing the Orlando/San Antonio style can’t win in the playoffs, because that’s obviously nonsense. It is to say that playoff basketball is a fundamentally different thing, and that any number of styles can win in that environment — especially considering the importance of matchups. The Spurs don’t have a second reliable big man to deal with the Zach Randolph/Marc Gasol combination, and Orlando’s perimeter players are either aging or inconsistent.

Just when you think you have the league figured out, the playoffs arrive and Zach Randolph elbows you in the rib cage before dropping in a jump hook.

11 THINGS I LIKE AND DON’T LIKE
(That’s right — one extra after an insane weekend)

1. Brandon Roy

There are things to quibble about — Roy’s sometimes self-serving complaints over the last two years, Dallas’ failure to get Dirk Nowitzki the ball down the stretch and at least one shaky officiating moment (the weird instant replay reversal). But what happened Saturday was a Moment, capital M, and we watch sports hoping to see Moments once or twice a year. Roy topped himself over and over during his 18-point fourth quarter, and the sight of his teammates mobbing him after the buzzer, refusing to let him go, was legitimately moving.

Regardless of what happens from here on out, Game 4 of Portland-Dallas will probably go down as the most memorable game of the season.

2. Dirk Nowitzki’s off-balance, one-legged bank shot 

Consider this my official campaign to get this shot somehow featured in The Point Forward’s logo. This is my favorite shot in the game, and when Dirk nailed a couple of these beauties recently against Portland, I found myself wondering if it might be my favorite go-to shot in the history of the league. Seriously.

3. The collapse of three all-around spark plugs

Knicks rookie Landry Fields didn’t play at the same level since the Carmelo Anthony trade, so his no-show in the playoffs wasn’t a shock. Fields excelled at filling the blank spaces that emerge in a motion-heavy, fast-paced offense, and he didn’t seem himself as the Knicks’ offense became slower and more isolation-heavy. New York tried to involve Fields against Boston, even as a ball-handler on pick-and-rolls, but it didn’t work.

In Portland, Rudy Fernandez has flat-lined in the playoffs again, with the exception of some pesky pressure defense on J.J. Barea during the fourth quarter of Game 4. We may just have to accept Fernandez for what he is at this point — a streaky shooter who runs the floor well but lacks a refined NBA half-court game on offense.

But the biggest story is the relegation of a banged-up Mike Miller to the fringes of Miami’s rotation. It’s not a disaster: Dwyane Wade and LeBron James bring all the ball-handling you’d ever need on the wing, and James Jones has re-emerged as a capable substitute in the Heat’s small lineups. Still, the dream in Miami was for the Heat to develop a crunch-time lineup that featured no traditional point guard, and Miller was supposed to be a key cog in that group. Beyond that, their bench is worse off without his versatility.

4. Brandon Bass’ jump shot 

It’s semi-reliable, and it’s an important part of Orlando’s offense because Bass is so often popping into open space behind Dwight Howard’s rolls to the hoop. But it’s not pretty. Bass loads up for an extra beat by bending deep, and his feet come far apart in mid-air and land that way. It looks like a ton of work. It is not graceful.

5. San Antonio’s court

I did not include San Antonio in my holiday season review of the league’s best and worst court designs, and that’s in part because Portland’s snazzier court uses the same basic design — a nice centerpiece; an empty central paint area; the circle and edges of the paint filled with the team’s main dark color (red in Portland, black in San Antonio).

But credit the Spurs: That’s a nice court. Remember when the mid-1990s Spurs had those disgusting pink and blueish hints built into both their logo and their floor? Even giving points for cultural relevancy, that logo just didn’t work.

6. Players raising their hand to claim a foul

I love this. Carl Landry gave us a fantastic example in Game 2 of New Orleans’ series against the Lakers, when he tried to claim a foul that obviously belonged to Emeka Okafor. Landry understood Okafor was in foul trouble, and when he heard the whistle, Landry shot his hand straight up even though he knew quite well he hadn’t made contact with anyone.

It didn’t fool the refs, but we appreciate the effort.

7. Indiana’s trapping of Derrick Rose

The jury is still out on whether this is a “like” or a “dislike,” but it’s definitely interesting, and it’s something teams throw at Rose now and then on pick-and-rolls. It’s even more interesting that Indiana has done this, as Frank Vogel has already taken one unconventional step in having his shooting guards defend Rose.

The risk/reward on this is fascinating. Rose has gotten so much better at being patient, keeping his dribble and finding holes when teams trap, and the Bulls are good at countering the trap by having one of their big men (often Joakim Noah) flash to the foul line, take a pass from Rose and find an open player somewhere else. Luol Deng has gotten several open threes out of this action. But the Pacers have also forced Rose into a heap of turnovers, including some that resulted directly from the hard traps. This is something to watch.

8. Memphis’ guards driving right at the post player 

The Grizzlies’ size advantage over San Antonio is obvious, but they benefit in ways that might be less obvious than Marc Gasol’s height advantage over Matt Bonner and all the double teams San Antonio must use.

Watch the Grizzliers’ perimeter players drive right at Gasol or Zach Randolph in the post and use them as a screener, knowing the guy defending the post (as long as its not Tim Duncan) is going to be scared of jumping off the Memphis big man to contain the drive. Memphis needs at least some scoring from its guards, and this is an effective way to get a few key points.

9. The Lakers’ big men working together 

We think of 7-footers working by themselves in the post, but the Lakers are good not only at moving their big men around (a basic element of the triangle) but also having them work together to produce small openings. Pau Gasol and Andrew Bynum have worked New Orleans by screening for each other on the block and forcing switches that make the Hornets uncomfortable. Gasol and Bynum have even run a pick-and-roll or two, and Lamar Odom works as the ball-handler in pick-and-rolls with Bynum a few times per game — usually to good results.

10. The point guard/small forward pick-and-roll 

The “1″/”3″ pick-and-roll is one of the go-to crunch-time plays for several playoff teams. It presents so many challenges for defenses that have to concern themselves with the combination of quickness and shooting range most of these small forward screeners bring. Do you switch yourselves into a height mismatch? Or do you try to fight the play without switching, giving the small forward a chance to slide open to the hoop or to a spot behind the three-point line?

The Pacers use it with Danny Granger and Darren Collison. Rose and Deng are great at it because Deng can slip the screen and move in some many different directions. Paul Pierce and Rajon Rondo have been working this play for years to draw switches. Russell Westbrook and Kevin Durant are getting better and better at, especially on the side of the court. The Heat will run it with LeBron and Mike Bibby in various formations. And the Jamal Crawford/Joe Johnson combination sort of counts because Johnson works as the small forward in several key Hawks lineups.

Plays like this become even more important in slowed-down postseason hoops.

11. The stretching of underdogs

This is one of my favorite things about the first round. We’ve seen it most vividly with the Sixers and Hornets. In Philadelphia, Doug Collins has tried about every big man combination imaginable, even going super-small for stretches with Andre Iguodala at power forward.

In New Orleans, Monty Williams knew by Game 3 that he could not score enough by running the same high pick-and-roll for Chris Paul on nearly every possession. He mixed things up in several ways — by having Okafor pretend to set a screen only to stop before setting it, do a 180 toward the hoop and take a pass from Paul; by having Okafor slide into deep post position right when Landry set a high screen for Paul; by having Paul set up a few feet apart, horizontally, from the screener, forcing the Lakers to prepare their defense and opening up a pocket pass; and by using Trevor Ariza as a screener for a left side pick-and-roll, clearing everyone else to the right sideline and letting Paul and Ariza go to work alone. The Hornets even ran a curl play for Okafor at one point!

Few of these things are effective long-term solutions, but it’s fun to watch outgunned teams scrap for points.